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Abstract 
The goal of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that foreign policy objectives result from 
incentives and pressures created by the international theater at large. These objectives evolve due 
to changes in historical context and occasional paradigm shifts in international relations. So, 
foreign policy objectives exist largely independent from any individual leader and rather emerge 
from adaptations forced upon states by circumstance. The project is a qualitative structured 
comparison between Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador during the Carter and Reagan years. 
It concludes that there is strong evidence to support the hypothesis and secondary claim.  
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Introductory Statement 
American foreign policy towards the Central American region under both Presidents Carter and 
Reagan was born out of two veins of U.S. history that crossed paths at the same moment in time. 
The first had existed since the early days of the state, Latin American foreign policy. The second 
was the new defining vein of the 20th century, containment. To understand the foreign policy of 
these two administrations one must first examine each vein individually and then observe which 
elements of each appear in the policies of Carter and Reagan. By analyzing how the United 
States. acted under these two administrations in the cases of Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador one can discern a lot about what motivates the United States. Significant is to determine 
the role or potentially lack thereof presidential personality plays in defining U.S. foreign policy 
objectives. 
Defining the Objective 
The goal of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that foreign policy objectives result from 
incentives and pressures created by the international theater at large. These objectives evolve due 
to changes in historical context and occasional paradigm shifts in international relations. So, 
foreign policy objectives exist largely independent from any individual leader and rather emerge 
from adaptations forced upon states by circumstance.  
Preliminary Argument 
My preliminary research suggests that there is good evidence that foreign policy objectives result 
from incentives and pressures created by the international theater as opposed to the personality of 
an individual leader. This research has been done on U.S. foreign policy in Nicaragua, 
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Guatemala, and El Salvador during the Carter and Reagan presidencies. What is significant in 
these cases is that some of the presidential personalities stated goals contrast. Moreover, the 
Carter administration expressly set out to change foreign policy objectives. So, consistency that 
exists across these two administrations suggest that presidential personality was not the central 
motivator of U.S. foreign policy.  
Structure 
This paper will first briefly review some of the relevant literature. Then, it will explore the 
starting point of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin America and the Cold War. This 
exploration will be used as a reference point in the conclusion to determine the merit of the 
secondary claim being made surrounding the evolution of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Next, a 
structured comparison will be made between the cases of Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador. Then, the reader will be left with some additional considerations. Lastly, conclusions 
will be drawn, and the implications of this thesis paper will be reviewed.  
Literature review 
Much scholarship already exists on the international system and its effects on the motivation of 
states. One scholar of note is Kenneth Waltz. He is a neo-realist whose work Theory of 
International Politics did much to advance the realist perspective. This particular brand of 
realism holds the variable of power to be the most salient determiner of state action. Scarcity in 
an anarchical system drives state action and the potential routes of that state are determined by its 
relative power (Waltz, 1979).  
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Relevant especially to Latin American politics is the work of Fernando Cardoso. In his 
influential book Dependency and Development he characterizes the relationship between 
periphery Latin American states and the hegemonic U.S. state as being dominated by a holy 
alliance between the periphery’s elites and the hegemon’s business class (Cardoso, 1979). This 
work is not an all-encompassing theory of international relations like that of Waltz. It is however 
a salient argument that economics is the principle driving force in relations between the United 
States and Latin America.  
An interesting scholar often put into the dependist camp is Noam Chomsky. His book Turning 
the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace is both a harsh critique 
of U.S. policy and an effort to make a claim on its motivations. Whereas Cardoso describes the 
relationship between the United States and Latin American states, Chomsky delves deep into 
what U.S. action was taken, why, and writes in graphic detail of its effects on the ground. His 
claim on the motivation of U.S. policy is a nuanced one having to do with the domestic political 
system, economics, and the inner workings of administrations. Essentially, the central idea is that 
the democratic-capitalist system motivates U.S. policy (Chompsky, 2015). 
Also relevant is a quantitative study that exists on how human rights affect the distribution of 
U.S. aid abroad. United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance by Clair Apodaca 
and Michael Stohl found that the human rights record of a regime receiving aid only affected 
economic aid. Military aid was not impacted (Apodaca, 1999). 
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The origin of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin America 
American objectives in Latin America in the early days of our nation had more to do with 
Europe than to do with Latin America. The United States sought to keep Europe from gaining 
strength in the region under the assumption that one day the United States would grow powerful 
enough to colonize and/or annex what it wanted. Moreover, Europeans in the Holy Alliance1 of 
1818 were explicitly united against democracy in an effort to preserve monarchies. The alliance 
was in direct response to the French revolution and subsequent rise of Napoleon. It had 
reinstalled monarchies in both Spain and Italy. Significant too is that Latin America had only just 
freed itself of colonialism2 and was covered with nascent democracies (Bailey, 1974, 177-190).  
Out of the situation two variables are of note. Firstly, the United States had a small, yet existent, 
security concern in the Holy Alliance. Secondly, U.S. clearly perceived a future opportunity for 
expansion of influence southwards.  
The famous Monroe Doctrine was tucked into a state of the union address on December 2, 1823 
in response to the situation. It states that “…as a principle in which the rights and interests of the 
United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition 
which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
colonization by any European powers (Monroe, 1823).” Unknown to Monroe at the time the 
British had already moved, and the French were made to publicly declare to leave Spanish 
America be. Additionally, its impact was purely rhetorical and without the support of the British 
                                                           
1 Russia, Austria, Prussia, England, and later France.  
2 Between 1808 and 1826 depending on the country 
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the U.S. would not have been able to stand against a European power. However, this reality 
almost made a dictum the only plausible action (Bailey, 1974, 177-190).  
This dictum is the earliest form of U.S.-Latin American policy and although it was directed at 
Europe, it began a policy trend towards Latin America that would continue through the 1970s 
and 80s. The trend reveals itself in the alternative possibility that the Monroe Doctrine rejected. 
It had been suggested by a British diplomat, George Canning, that the United States. and Great 
Britain issue a joint manifesto against European intervention in the Americas. The agreement 
was declined largely due to the influence of Secretary of State Adams. He was wary of an 
agreement that might prevent the U.S. from itself expanding into Latin America (Bailey, 1974, 
177-190).  
So, the original policy on which the United States would base the rest of its Latin American 
policy on reflects an American desire exert its control over Latin America territorially and to a 
lesser degree politically.   
The origin of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Cold War era 
The Cold War era began at a time and perhaps in response to two radical changes to the 
international theater. Firstly, technologically humanity achieved such awesomely destructive 
weapons that a new calculation was introduced to the world stage. This was a permanent change 
that continues to affect the calculous of states today. Secondly, there was a power shift in the 
world. Power spilled out of western Europe and into the opposing forces of Moscow and 
Washington D.C. Although the Cold War is thought to have started after WWII, the success of 
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the Russian Revolution sparked the conflict and created the situation in which new American 
foreign policy objectives arose (Gaddis, 2007). 
These dramatic changes should be thought of as constituting a new world order because of two 
fundamental shifts in the international theater. For the first time in history the utilization of a 
weapon could potentially present an existential threat to humanity.3 Also, the polarity of the 
world drastically shifted from a multi-polar world dominated by western Europe to a bi-polar 
world dominated by the United States and the USSR. 
Helpful to those studying Cold War objectives is that there exists a document on which U.S. 
Cold War policy was based, George Kennan’s long telegram. Kennan lays out the underlying 
motivations of the Soviet government as he sees them and how those motivations make the 
USSR a natural and outright enemy to the United States. Kennan wrote of the USSR, “In 
summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there 
can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony 
of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of 
our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure (“George Kennan’s…,1946).” The most 
prominent irreconcilable difference between the two states is the ideological difference between 
them. Further, there existed a power vacuum that pitted the two states against one another 
geopolitically (“George Kennan’s…, 1946). 
                                                           
3 Notably, at the dawn of the Cold War it was not universally accepted that nuclear weapons would be 
categorically different than others. However, after Japan no state used the weapons and by the Eisenhower 
administration at the latest the categorical difference had become clear.   
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How the containment policy prescribed by Kennan was enacted by Truman demonstrates how 
these new objectives created by the new world order solidified. The communists of North Korea, 
China, and the USSR were collaborating at the time and Moscow specifically made a 
miscalculation. Those in Moscow did not believe that the United States would move to military 
defend Korea (Gaddis, 2007). So, Truman’s swift movement to do so and the ensuing support of 
congress reflects the degree to which the newly emerged foreign policy objectives laid out by 
Kennan had solidified to become foundational to how the United States would act in the new 
world order.  
Significant is the language used by Truman while leading the United States into action in Korea. 
The declaration was noticeably multilateral (“Statement by…, 1950). The United States had not 
been part of a peacetime military alliance since its alliance with France in the 1800s to affirm 
American independence (Gaddis, 2007). So, the turn to multilateralism in fact bucked the trend 
in U.S. foreign policy up until that point. It emphasizes the character of the new world order 
created by the fall of Western Europe. Two systems had emerged and for the United States to 
defend its interest internationally its preferred system required active maintenance.  
Korea cemented a trend that would continue throughout the Cold War. The United States was 
willing to fight a ground war to prevent the spread of communism. Moreover, the global 
communist movement was shown, as Kennan had suggested, to be at least in some capacity 
managed by Moscow. So, while this case would not have provided evidence that in all cases 
Moscow was behind communist movements, it certainly demonstrated Soviet involvement was a 
real possibility (Gaddis, 2007). 
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The new foreign policy objective born out of the new word order was in essence a security 
objective. Prevent the USSR from garnering more power by preventing the increase in its 
potential satellites. I.e. prevent the spread of communism.  
Case 1: Nicaragua 
American policy in Nicaragua before 1977 can be summed up in a quote about Anastasio 
Somoza that is attributed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, “He may be a son of a bitch, but 
he’s our son of a bitch (Isbester, 2011, 157-181).” 
When Carter took office, he was met with a Nicaraguan state dominated by the Somoza-elite 
alliance. Somoza had received U.S. support in exchange for defending U.S. economic and 
political interests. Notably, the power that enabled the Somozas to rule was projected through the 
National Guard. The origin of this National Guard was American policy in the Great Depression 
Era (Isbester, 2011, 157-181). The National Guard can be thought of as a tool forged by 
Americans and handed to the Somozas to maintain political control of the Nicaraguan state. 
Important to understand are some of the internal dynamics and trends that existed below the level 
of general political control when Carter took office. The agricultural sector dominated the 
Nicaraguan economy. Most of the fertile land was used by large scaled farms owned by the 
elites. In the 1960s Nicaragua in conjunction with the Alliance For Progress4 executed import 
substitution industrialization policies meant to begin industrializing the country. Some economic 
gains were made, and the manufacturing sector began to form. However, due to inflation in the 
early 1970s, much of these economic gains were lost and the ISI policies appear to have failed. 
                                                           
4 U.S. program meant to foster economic growth and reduce social unrest.  
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Moreover, structural economic factors contributed to further impoverishment of the poor in the 
1970s (Isbester, 2011, 157-181). 
Significant is that the Somoza family used its position to edge the elites out of their economic 
domination and the family would come to own a significant share of the private sector. Also, the 
FSNL or Sandinistas had formed in the early 1960s. It was an armed group of insurgents inspired 
by both the historical figure Augusto Sandino5 and the Cuban Revolution (Isbester, 2011, 157-
181). Thus, Carter began his administration’s U.S.-Nicaraguan relations with a state ruled by a 
weakened Somoza-elite alliance that faced an armed insurrection. 
Carter when taking office openly set out to reshape and redefine U.S. foreign policy. In his 
inauguration address he said,  
“I would hope that the nations of the world might say that we had built a lasting peace, based not 
on weapons of war but on international policies which reflect our own most precious values. 
These are not just my goals, and they will not be my accomplishments, but the affirmation of our 
nation's continuing moral strength and our belief in an undiminished, ever-expanding American 
dream (Carter, 1977).” 
This rhetoric accompanied by his legislative agenda meant to reduce human rights abuses by 
dictators, many of whom the United States itself installed, have made his name synonymous with 
human rights in the mind of the American public.  
In the case of Nicaragua, the Carter administration’s rhetoric would not become concrete policy 
until 1978 when Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a political opponent of the Somozas, was assassinated 
(Katovich, 1993). By 1978 there was no ambiguity surrounding the category of human rights 
abuses occurring in Nicaragua. In 1976 Edelberto Torres, a Nicaraguan historian living in exile, 
                                                           
5 Leader of early revolutionary movement in Nicaragua  
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had testified before congress that the regime was responsible for rape, castration, and various 
forms of torture. Notably, both an arms credit agreement and significant economic aid was 
nevertheless approved for Nicaragua for the fiscal year 1978 (Katovich, 1993).   
In June of 1978, Somoza made a public pledge to improve human rights in Nicaragua (Katovich, 
1993). To encourage the regime to make good on such promises in July of that year President 
Carter sent a congratulatory letter to Somoza. Moreover, in 1978 the administration in its budget 
proposal for the fiscal year 1979 requested $150,000 for a military training grant to give to the 
Nicaraguan national guard. These both occurred while the regime continued to commit abuses 
through the national guard (Goshko, 1978).  
In October of 1978 the Carter administration in conjunction with the Organization of American 
States (OAS) attempted to mediate an agreement between the Sandinistas and the regime. 
However, those talks collapsed by January of 1979. Notably, the proposal put forth by the OAS6 
did not allow for the possibility of a Sandinista interim government. This at a minimum suggests 
that the Carter administration was hesitant to endorse a leftist group for a government (Katovich, 
1993).  
In June of 1979, the Sandinistas launched a major offensive against the Somoza regime. In that 
same month, an ABC news reporter was shot and killed by the Nicaraguan national guard. The 
footage aired worldwide (Katovich, 1993). 
In response to the coming fall of the regime the Carter administration proposed to the OAS a 
solution that would allow for an interim non-Sandinista government. The proposal was rejected 
                                                           
6 Of which the United States is a member 
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(Katovich, 1993). In July of 1979, the possibility of an interim government would end.  Somoza 
fled the country and the national guardsmen abandoned their posts (Isbester, 2011, 157-181).  
The results of this civil war were devastating to Nicaragua. Somoza left $1.6 billion in debt, the 
fighting had caused over $400 million in property damages, and 20% of the people were 
homeless (Isbester, 2011, 157-181). The country then came to be governed by a national 
directorate whose members each represented a different faction of the FSLN (Frente Sandista de 
Liberación Nacional). The Sandinistas did initially receive some support from the Carter 
administration (Isbester, 2011, 157-181), however that support was quickly rebuked due to 
Sandinista ties to El Salvadorian leftist insurgents.  
The Reagan administration came to power in the United State in 1981. Reagan’s take on foreign 
policy was markedly different to that of the Carter administration. Reagan advocated a 
strengthening of the military and sought to push back what he thought of as Soviet influence 
across the globe. To do so, the administration sought the use of proxies on the ground that were 
already fighting and/or open to taking on perceived or actual communist regimes (Pach, 2006).  
In Nicaragua, this would take the form of the Contras. After coming into office his 
administration quickly supplied the CIA with $20 million to train a group that would come to be 
known as the Contras in Honduras. The Contras were made up of former Somoza national guard 
members and other mercenaries. The group described itself as counterrevolutionary and used 
terrorism to deter Nicaraguans from cooperating with the new government. The Contras 
commanded about 15,000 soldiers at its height (Isbester, 2011, 157-181).  
U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in Central America 1977-1989: Underlying Objectives in 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador 
Honors Thesis for Thomas Pappas 
- 14 - 
 
Putting aside whether the Sandinistas were communists and/or a Soviet satellite, the Contras 
while unable to gain a foothold in Nicaragua did significantly harm the new government. By 
1982 half of the Nicaraguan budget went to fighting the Contras. Moreover, the new government 
lost popular support and began to face mounting international pressure to hold an election 
(Isbester, 2011, 157-181).  
Reagan’s strategy to oust the Sandinistas was not limited to funding the Contras. The 
administration also sought the moral high ground via a war of information against the 
Sandinistas. It charged them with genocide, drug trade involvement, terrorism and more. 
Granted, many of the claims were without evidence. In fact, the abuses of the Contras far 
outweigh the abuses of the Sandinistas.7 Nonetheless, the Reagan administration’s rhetoric was a 
tool leveraged to disparage the Sandinista reputation worldwide (Chomsky, 2015, 106). 
The Sandinistas, due to domestic and international pressure, called for an election in 1984. 
Rightwing parties backed by the United States largely did not participate. The FSNL won. The 
Reagan administration decried the election as fraudulent. Although, notably governments 
elsewhere disagreed. The turnout was over 70% and over 90% of those eligible to vote registered 
to do so (Isbester, 2011, 157-181).  
Public support for the Contras waned and so the Congress explicitly forbade further monetary 
support of the group. Notoriously, the Reagan administration continued to support the Contras. It 
used the $40 million that it received from an arms deal with Iran to fund the group (Matthews, 
2017).  This war cost Nicaragua more and more over time. In addition to the national budget 
                                                           
7 That’s not to say that the Sandinistas did not commit human rights abuses rather that the amount committed 
was comparatively small.  
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mentioned above, some $50 million in damage to economic infrastructure was caused annually 
by the conflict. Only a year after Reagan left office the Sandinistas lost at the ballot box largely 
due to U.S. influence (Isbester, 2011, 157-181).  
U.S. objectives that seem most apparent in this case are undermine the Sandinistas, 
defend/establish a US friendly government, and maintain the capitalist economy. Both presidents 
demonstrated a desire to exert political control over the state. Carter sought to force the state to 
enforce human rights and avoid a Sandinista takeover. Reagan attempted to thwart the control of 
the Sandinistas.  
Carter, despite opening disliking Somoza, demonstrated an attempt to prevent the loss of U.S. 
political control through his administration’s budget proposal for 1979, the proposals to the OAS 
that excluded the possibility of Sandinista governance, and perhaps most of all the letter he sent 
to Somoza congratulating him on his human rights pledges. The letter is significant because it 
demonstrated Carter’s preference to work within the existing framework of a U.S.-regime 
alliance over the alternative of forcing a democratic and therefore unpredictable outcome. Carter 
made apparent that his administration supported Somoza, begrudgingly or not, over the 
Sandinistas despite Carter’s open opposition to Somoza’s human rights record.  
Reagan demonstrated an attempt at political control through his administration’s continued and 
unwavering support of the Contras, even in the face of a Congressional order not to do so, and a 
war of information against the Sandinistas. Of note is the administration’s continued 
denouncement of the Sandinistas even after they won an election. This strongly suggests that 
what the Reagan administration valued was not democracy but rather a pro-U.S. government.  
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So, the actions of both presidents both propagate the same basic goals. That is not to say that 
neither presidential personalities had a strong impact on US foreign policy objectives. Rather, 
that the fundamental goal was established by the historical situation and existing goals the 
presidents were presented with. The U.S., being the hegemon of the region, had been 
consistently motivated to excerpt political controls on the smaller states around it for years. 
Important is that there was some shift in U.S. value on political control. The United States. had 
the capacity to forcibly install a new regime as it had done in the past. However, neither the 
Carter nor Reagan administration decided to do so. This suggests that unlike previous 
administrations in the era of Reagan and Carter intervention had either been removed from the 
realm of possibilities or deemed too great a cost to ceding political control. 
The above finding that presidential personality was unable to affect the underlying goals of the 
United States state is strong. Carter specifically set out to change how the United States operated. 
Indeed, he was able to mitigate the goals established and sought after by previous 
administrations. This is evident in the decision not to intervene on behalf of Somoza.8 However, 
the circumstance that he inherited did not permit him to abandon the struggle against the 
Sandinistas, the defense of a U.S. friendly government, nor the maintenance of a capitalist 
Nicaragua. The Reagan administration openly and relentlessly sought increased U.S. political 
control of the state. So, in his case his personality intentionally or not was largely in line with 
existing objectives. Thus, he did little to affect them.  
                                                           
8 It is possible that even under a more hawkish administration this may have not been politically possible because 
of the murder of an ABC reporter at the hands of the Somoza regime.  
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Case 2: Guatemala 
In June of 1954 Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas invaded Guatemala from Honduras. His private 
army was funded and supported by the CIA. The Guatemalan National Guard did not defend the 
government and so the democratically elected president, President Colonel Jacobo Arbenez 
Guzmán, resigned (Isbester, 2011, 131-155). 
This invasion is exemplative of a generally unilateral and interventionist track record in 
Guatemala before Carter. In fact, it was in Guatemala that the United States trained the troops 
that it used in the now infamous Bay of Pigs Invasion. There were several coups between the 
time of Armas and the election of Carter. These coups were due to largely internal factors and so, 
the United States seemingly was uninterested in the individual coups (Isbester, 2011, 131-155). 
Instead, administration after administration simply supported each subsequent leader as the 
underlying relationship did not seem to change across different Guatemalan regimes.  
Guatemala was of unique economic importance to the US, especially in the time of Carter. 
Firstly, over 100 U.S. corporations operated in Guatemala. Notably, 31 of these were Fortune top 
100 companies. Secondly, Guatemala has deposits of nickel and oil. Both are required for 
modern industry and in the 1970s reliable sources of oil was top of mind for U.S. policy makers. 
Thirdly, the private sector had already invested great sums of money into developing raw 
material extraction in Guatemala. So, while not existential, there existed potential risk to 
important American economic entities (Rojas). 
The agenda Carter brought to Guatemala was in essence the same one described in Nicaragua. 
He sought to set human rights as a fundamental tenet of U.S.-Guatemalan policy. It was quickly 
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made clear that an agenda focusing on human rights was not going to be endorsed by his 
contemporaries in the Guatemalan government. In April of 1977, the Guatemalan minister of 
foreign relations characterized the U.S. report on human rights in Guatemala as an intervention 
into Guatemalan affairs and a breach of sovereignty. Moreover, Guatemala rejected US military 
support (Castañeda, 2007).9 
An important actor to bring into the discussion here is Israel. In 1977 Israel became the largest 
supplier of arms to Guatemala. Later, the infamous Guatemalan general Héctor Mario López10 
would describe Israel as Guatemala’s number one friend. Moreover, in 1981 the United States 
began to fund the purchase of Israeli arms by periphery states (Castañeda, 2007). Further, during 
the Carter years Guatemala continued to receive U.S. military support. While true new arms 
deals could not be made with Guatemala, deals already authorized continued the flow of arms 
southward through 1980 (White, 1984, 104). 
So, the Carter administration seemingly changed the relationship rhetorically while substantively 
allowing it to continue mostly unchanged. That is not to say that the administration did not in 
good faith attempt to transform U.S. policy rather that the material support of the United States 
and its ally Israel continued to bolster the Guatemlan military in spite of the surface level 
changes made. In fact, arms support from the U.S. did not dip much below the norm in the Carter 
era due to the shipments that had been already authorized (Chomsky, 2015, 47).  
                                                           
9 Despite this, the government did try to acquire some military equipment at the end of 1978. The attempted 
purchase was denied. Further, the support being rejected was the same to be denied to Guatemala due to human 
rights concerns. I.e. it was not going to be sent in any event. Moreover, it did not impact already approved 
support. 
10 He would come to be found guilty of many crimes against the Mayan people while working under Montt  
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After the election of Reagan, direct military aid to Guatemala was restarted. Reagan was able to 
get around the human rights legislation of the 1970s by claiming that Ríos Montt, the dictator 
that took over in a coup in 1982, represented movement towards respecting human rights 
(Chomsky, 2015, 47). By subsequently maintaining that the regime of Mejía Víctores, that 
followed Montt, was also showing improvements he was in fact able to increase military aid to 
Guatemala (Chomsky, 2015, 47-58). 
Like in other cases, the Reagan administration unabashedly preferred military dictatorship to 
what it perceived as a potential Marxist takeover in Guatemala. Some numbers are helpful to 
understanding the threat that the opposition force posed. In 1982 an alliance between 
revolutionaries seeking political change and the Mayan peasantry that had been oppressed for 
years formed. About half a million Maya were protesting, hundreds of thousands of supporters 
joined them, and between 6 to 8 thousand fighters were in armed rebellion. The alliance between 
the Maya and the guerillas was called the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). It 
was in response to this mass movement that in 1982 Montt, upon seizing control of the state, 
began conducting what can only be described as a genocidal scorched earth campaign against the 
URNG (Isbester, 2011, 131-155).  
The URNG would not recover from Montt’s offensive until 1987 when it continued its guerrilla 
efforts. During the time that the URNG was initially defeated and 1987 a new constitution had 
been ratified and elections had been held.11 This is relevant because it correlates with an increase 
in military aid from the Reagan administration. Between 1986 and 1987 over 200 million dollars 
                                                           
11 Notably, the democratically elected government also abused human rights 
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in military aid was supplied to Guatemala. Then, the administration requested about 140 million 
dollars for the fiscal years of 1988 and 1989 (Broder, 1988).  
So, the Reagan administration’s policy can be regarded as rhetorically and militarily supporting 
the Guatemalan government in every form it took while he was in office. The administration’s 
rhetoric claimed human rights improvements seemingly to justify direct and increasing military 
aid.12  
The central U.S. objective that both Carter and Reagan acted out in this case is the defense of a 
capitalistic government in Guatemala. This objective aligns with the historical precedent of the 
Monroe Doctrine and containment policy. Moreover, both seemingly did so via military support. 
In this case, it does not appear that either presidential personality affected U.S. objectives. It 
could be that because the civil war would not come to an end until the 1990s that the 
administrations did not see an opening to make a shift. Further, it is of note that the genocide of 
the Maya did not begin until after Carter. Thus, it is conceivable that the Carter administration 
would have stopped support after a certain threshold of abuse. That is impossible to know. 
The objective in this case has been coined as the defense of a capitalist government because 
Guatemala was politically chaotic and had been for years. Leading up to and indeed throughout 
the Carter and Reagan administrations coups were commonplace in Guatemala. Telling is that in 
1954 the United States intervened to eliminate a democratically elected leader who sought leftist 
reforms (Isbester, 2011, 131-155) and yet throughout these two administrations both military and 
                                                           
12 It should be emphasized that I’ve no evidence that anyone explicitly lied about the state of human rights in 
Guatemala. However, considering the state of affairs on the ground it would be hard to imagine that 
administration officials had no idea that the government(s) were not respecting human rights.  
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civilian leaders received military support. Therefore, one can infer the underlying variable 
determining U.S. intervention to be the economic system espoused by the government. This 
conclusion is consistent with the continued arms flow despite human rights abuses.  
Significant is that the insistence of a capitalist government is a form of political control. It has 
been deemed a defense of a capitalist government to reflect that it is a lesser form of political 
control than could otherwise be observed. The United States in this case was neither motivated to 
enact different policies towards democratic or military governments nor even policies to promote 
stability.  
Important to discuss is the discrepancy between the Carter administration’s rhetorical and 
legislative efforts and its substantive policy. It reveals the constraints on presidential 
personalities to make comport their own conception of U.S. objectives with the actions of the 
U.S. state. Carter openly took on Guatemala on human rights. In addition to rhetoric it did 
prohibit further arms deals with the government. At a surface level, one might conclude this to be 
an example of a presidential personality forcibly changing U.S. objectives. However, upon closer 
consideration it actually proves the difficulty a president faces to do so. 
As discussed in this case, because arms had already been authorized they continued to flow only 
slightly below normal levels throughout most of the Carter years. That is to say nothing of the 
arms supplied by Israel. In summary, the U.S. president despite being publicly opposed to the 
shipment of arms to Guatemala oversaw that very act continued both by the government he 
oversaw and that of a close ally. Moreover, Carter was not willing to act beyond stopping arms 
deals in future.  
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Despite his best efforts, the material military support for governments that served to prevent 
leftist governments continued under the Carter administration. Further, the rhetorical change did 
little to change the situation on the ground in large part due to actions taken by past 
administrations. Thus, the finding in this case that presidential personality did not impact the 
motivations underlaying policy objectives is strong.  
Notably, in this case the underlying motivator identified comports well with existing U.S. policy 
and the incentives of the Cold War system.  
Case 3: El Salvador 
In the 1930s a left of center Autruo Araujo won the presidency legitimately. Simultaneously, a 
wave of communist party members won seats in the legislature. In response to the left’s election, 
the military led by General Hernández Martínez overthrew the government and established a 
military dictatorship. The dictatorship evolved into oligarchy as the so called 14 families came to 
own most of the country’s resources. The military government can be considered the defender to 
the wealthy class. Notably, in 1932 it executed La Mantanza (the massacre), a brutal put down of 
a popular uprising led by nationalist-socialists (White, 1984).  
In the 1960s El Salvador, like other Latin American states, received military and specifically 
counterinsurgency training by the United States so that local forces could serve as the bulwark 
against communist uprisings. In El Salvador this initiative was run by a group called the 
Democratic National Organization (ORDEN). It was notorious for human rights abuses against 
the people of the countryside (White, 1984).  
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So, when Carter took office U.S. policy towards the state up until that point was principally to 
keep the state prepared. Anti-government guerrilla forces had begun to organize in the early 
1970s. Also relevant, El Salvador’s economy was reliant on coffee which the United States is 
and was at the time a large importer of (White, 184). 
In the first year of Carter’s presidency, El Salvador had an election. Important to understand is 
that the elections were wrought with fraud. The Part of National Coalition Party’s candidate won. 
This was the party of the military. Notably, in 1977 a ban on new arms deals to El Salvador was 
implemented (Chompsky, 2015, 140). The existence of show elections is important to note 
because it would join hands with the influence of the Nicaraguan case to influence the most 
substantive years of Carter’s policy decisions in El Salvador, 1979 and 1980.  
There was real fear in the late 1970s that the military regime would be overthrown (Chomsky, 
2015, 140). This fear seemingly arose from two sources. First, the Sandinista overthrow of 
Somoza. Second, the existence of a ballot box to take over. In other words, the difficulty of 
establishing a democracy in which leftist candidates could legitimately win was reduced because 
a new system would not have to be created rather the existing one cleansed of fraud.  
The Carter administration backed a military coup in 1979 meant to circumvent a potential 
revolution (Chomsky, 2015, 140-151). The officers that conducted the coup ousted two thirds of 
the military’s senior officials. Influenced by the Carter administration, the first so called 
revolutionary junta contained three Social Democrats (left leaning civilians) and two members of 
the military’s party. Of course, the real power remained in the hands of the military. Because the 
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government would not cease its previously mentioned counterinsurgency campaign in the 
countryside, the Social Democrats quickly resigned from their posts (White, 1984).   
After one more junta failed due to resignation by the civilian left, the government settled into a 
junta headed by José Napoleón Duarte. The new government nationalized the banking system 
and instituted U.S.-backed agrarian reforms (White, 1984). The Carter administration in 
collaboration with the new government seemingly sought to alleviate some of the left’s 
complaints without allowing El Salvador to fall into leftist control.  
The Carter administration then moved to lift a previous ban it had instituted on military aid to El 
Salvador in 1977 in order to support the new regime. So, in the last year of the Carter 
administration millions of dollars in military support flowed into Duarte’s coffers. Significant is 
that right before the end of the Carter administration some American agrarian reform advisors in 
El Salvador were killed. Moreover, the guerilla group Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) 
began a major offensive against the government. In response, Carter granted an additional 10 
million dollars in military support for the government just a week before Reagan would take 
office (White, 1984).  
Upon taking office, Reagan quickly increased the allowed amount of U.S. military advisors in El 
Salvador. Under Carter it had been 19. Reagan moved it to 55 (White, 1984). As Reagan 
increased support, so did the guerilla’s numbers grow. By 1984 they reached 10 thousand armed 
fighters (Chomsky, 2015, 148). That is not to say that Reagan caused this increase, rather that the 
scale of the battle was increasing and the administration was ready and willing to buy into the 
increased cost of defending the government.  
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The Reagan administration also backed its commitment to El Salvador monetarily. Of note, to do 
this he used discretionary funds multiple times just within his first year of office. Assuming the 
statute allowing him to do so was enacted in good faith, the use of this fund reflects the belief on 
behalf of the administration that there existed an emergency that seriously and immediately 
threatened U.S. interests. Between 1981 and 1983 the administration influenced the IMF and 
World Bank to grant El Salvador over 300 million dollars in loans. Then, in 1984 it requested 
300 million dollars in support for El Salvador from Congress (Bonner, 2016).  
In 1983, when Duarte’s government launched its largest military operation against the guerillas 
in the war, U.S. military advisors were present in an open way. There was no attempt to make 
U.S. military support and advice clandestine in this case (Bonner, 2016). In addition to tactical 
advice on the ground, the United States under Reagan also provided reconnaissance on guerilla 
positions from the air. This information helped to increase the accuracy of bombing missions 
carried out against the opposition forces (Chomsky, 2015, 170).  
Reagan’s policy towards El Salvador can be characterized as wartime support for the 
government. He inherited a wartime scenario and the war did not end until the George H.W. 
Bush administration. So, one cannot observe how the Reagan administration would have handled 
either an escalation or de-escalation of tensions. What can be observed is that Reagan sought to 
provide the El Salvadoran government with ample material and human resources to defeat the 
guerrilla forces. This observation comports well with Reagan’s general policy of preventing the 
spread of communism in the third world.  
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The principle objective acted out by both administrations in this case was to exert political 
control over El Salvador. Both administrations sought this goal via military support, political 
support, and direct consultation. The theme across both presidents was an involved effort to aid 
the military dominated government avoid the sort of overthrow that occurred in Nicaragua.  
The details of this case in the Carter years are important to understanding what was motivating 
U.S. policy. Actions that Carter chose NOT to take in response to developments on the ground 
are telling. The coup in 1979 reflected a worry within the military itself that its rule would be 
overthrown. This worry is further demonstrated by its surface level concessions to the left. If one 
posited that Carter had through his proclamations cemented human rights as a primary U.S. 
foreign policy objective, then one would have expected in 1979 the administration to leverage 
the precarious position of the new government to permanently disband ORDEN forces and 
legitimize elections. It is evident that the United States had the means to do so. Moreover, the 
Carter administration had withheld aid from the military officials in power before the coup. So, 
there was some existing policy to build upon. However, the administration instead engaged the 
new government and helped it form a strategy to maintain power against the pleading of people 
on the ground like Archbishop Romero13 who alerted the administration to the litany of abuses 
occurring. By choosing to support the government that would come to be headed by Durarte, the 
Carter administration demonstrated a prioritization of defending a US friendly and capitalistic 
government over the enforcement of human rights.  
                                                           
13 Notable figure in the El Salvadoran civil war. Important to insert here because he was an internationally known 
figure in El Salvador at the time of his open letters to the Carter administration.  
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Political control is the correct way to frame the motivations reflected by U.S. action in this case. 
The Carter administration was influential in creating the agrarian reforms meant to demonstrate 
concessions to the peasantry and quell unrest. Moreover, Reagan advisors and intelligence were 
directly involved in the planning of Duarte’s counterinsurgency strategy. A strategy which was 
carried out by U.S. trained ORDEN forces. These actions demonstrate that the United States 
sought to use El Salvador as a tool in its worldwide campaign against the USSR by keeping it 
within its own sphere of influence.  
The actions of the Reagan administration further reflect a prioritization of political control above 
all else. Telling is the administration’s use of discretionary fund money to support Duarte in its 
early days. This action required specifically that the administration consider U.S. interests to be 
in immediate danger. The situation on the ground was precarious for the new government. 
Although a new cast of characters, important to note here is that the military was still the central 
power of the state. So, by supporting the new government with discretionary fund money the 
Reagan administration categorized the defense of a military government that the United States 
had been supporting since before the dawn of the Cold War as essential to U.S. interests. Thus, 
the administration can be thought of as implicitly citing the maintenance of the pro U.S. military 
government, i.e. political control, as a core U.S. interest.  
Presidential personality did not appear to play any role in establishing US foreign policy 
objectives in this case. Both personalities sought the same fundamental goal despite Carter’s 
human rights stance. This finding is strong because the developments in this case provided 
Carter with a clear chance to push his human rights agenda and yet he chose not to. Additionally, 
the Reagan administration pursued this goal at high monetary cost which reflects its importance.  
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Comparative Analysis 
These cases confirm the hypothesis that foreign policy objectives result from incentives and 
pressures created by the international theater at large. Both administrations seemingly perused, 
albeit to different scales at times, the same goals in every case. These goals comport well with 
the pressure created by the international power struggle of the Cold War international theater.  
Additionally, the perceived failure in case of Nicaragua in fact incentivized the implementation 
of more intense means to achieve the goal of political control in El Salvador by the Carter 
administration. This suggests that broad U.S. foreign policy objectives may become more 
important in an individual state after they are undermined in a close by state.  
The secondary claim that foreign policy objectives evolve due to changes in historical situation 
and occasional paradigm shifts in international relations has also been supported by the evidence. 
The objectives of political influence in Latin America and preventing the spread of communism 
identified in the explorations of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the Cold War are 
markedly similar to the objectives acted out in the cases. Further, the differences, at least 
superficially, appear to be due to historical context and a paradigm shift. For example, the United 
States became more capable and thus more able to concern itself directly with political influence 
in Latin America as opposed to the potential of influence.  
The assertion flowing out of the hypotheses that foreign policy objectives exist largely 
independent from any individual leader is substantiated by the evidence. As observed in all three 
cases, an explicit effort by a presidential personality to change the fundamental objectives of the 
United States does little in the face of the state’s organically created objectives.  
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Important is an assessment of the limitations of this comparative analysis. The central limitation 
of this thesis is the metric used. Actions and the amount of resources used to execute those 
actions are used to discern the underlying motivation or goal. This metric is imperfect largely 
because it is trying to measure an abstract and uncertain entity. I.e. state objectives or motivators 
do not exist in a physical sense. They cannot be measured in the same way the volume of a pool 
can be measured. So, interpretation is intrinsic to any study of state objectives.  
Further, several assumptions are made. It is assumed that the presidents and their administrations 
made an honest effort to further the objectives of the United States both in the cases examined 
and in the historical themes explored before the cases. Lastly, it is assumed that the 
administrations had good information to act upon.  
Despite the limitations and assumptions that underlie this thesis, the confirmations remain strong. 
The qualitative evidence in all three cases revealed a significant difference in what Carter 
proclaimed to be an essential objective of U.S. foreign policy and the objective that his 
administration acted out. Compounding this evidence is the fact that in all three cases the Reagan 
administration ramped up Carter era policy as the situation on the ground became more and more 
unfavorable to underlying U.S. objectives. This reflects that both administrations identified the 
same underlying U.S. policy goals despite being from opposite political parties.  
Additional Considerations 
I worry that because this thesis focused so much on whether Carter was able to make human 
rights a fundamental tenet of U.S. foreign policy that the reader may be led to believe that the I 
am against U.S. support for human rights. This could not be further from the truth. If Carter had 
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proclaimed growing corn to be a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy, the study would have 
focused on whether or not the US began to shift its efforts to the cultivation of corn. What I’m 
after in this thesis is answering the question did human rights become a central tenet of U.S. 
through the actions of the Carter administration? 
Overall, what I hope that the reader took away from this thesis paper is an understanding of how 
profound the sources of US foreign policy are. One should never reduce the national interests of 
the US, or any other state, to the interests expressed by an individual leader.  
Conclusions 
This thesis has two potential implications for the international relations literature. Firstly, it adds 
to an existing pool of evidence suggesting that the realist theory of international relations is the 
most accurate theory available. Secondly, it invites more research into the mechanisms of the 
international system. It also has potential implications for U.S. policy makers.  
This study repeatedly found the United States to be motivated by its security and power interests. 
Of course, the hypothesis looked at whether the international theater underlay and motivated 
U.S. policy objectives not which variables within the system were most relevant. Nevertheless, 
while testing the hypothesis themes of security and power repeatedly emerged. So, at the very 
least this thesis opens the door for realists to examine these cases and argue their theory to be 
substantiated. Moreover, the motifs of security and power call into question the claim that 
economics drive U.S. foreign policy advocated by dependist scholars.  
Important for international relations scholars of all persuasion is the addition to the pool of 
literature a work specifically addressing a concern that could undercut the legitimacy of any 
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theory. For any theory of international relations to be predictive of how states will act it needs to 
be assumed that there is some underlying reason or set of rules. That is not to say that the system 
needs a set of rules. In fact, realists expressly argue that it does not have rules rather patterns 
exist due to the nature of the system. Realist, like all theory makers, base their theory on the 
assumption that the motivations of a state are not completely random.   
This thesis does add to the defense of theorists by providing evidence that the international 
theater is what drives states to adopt the objectives that they do. More exciting still is that it 
invites further study into the specific incentives and pressures that exist in the system. One could 
use this as a launchpad into a study on the potential impact proximity may have on the degree the 
United States is willing to invest in supporting its proxies.  
Lastly, this thesis affects the world of policy makers. By taking the hypothesis and secondary 
claim together one is left with an obvious question, could someone predict the evolution of 
objectives within a consistent paradigm? This thesis removes the need for one to try and predict 
elections to predict the movement of U.S. foreign policy. I hope that this excites policy makers to 
engage with the international relations literature and try to develop predictive hypothesis on U.S. 
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